Category Archives: General

Gemalto preliminary first semester results and 2017 outlook revision

Amsterdam, July 21, 2017 – Based on its preliminary first semester results, Gemalto (Euronext NL0000400653 – GTO) revenue for second quarter is €742 million, lower by 9% at constant exchange rates compared to the same period of 2016. For the first semester, the Company profit from operations is in line with expectations at approximately €93 million.

Looking ahead, the second quarter double digit decline for Payment in Americas and SIM business is anticipated to continue for the rest of the year. This decline will be offset by the expected revenue acceleration in Enterprise, Machine-to-Machine and Government Programs including 3M Identity Management Business, leading to a stable revenue year-on-year for the second semester.

Taking into account these revenue trends, the operating leverage of Payment and SIM businesses will not be realized as expected. The effect of the the transition plan announced in April is anticipated to start contributing materially towards the end of the year. Gemalto estimates its 2017 second semester profit from operations to be between €200 million and €230 million.

As a result of the deteriorated prospects for the removable SIM market, the Company is expected to book a non-cash goodwill impairment charge of approximately €420 million in the first semester of 2017.

The Company will provide further details when it publishes its first semester results on September 1, 2017.

* All figures in this press release are unaudited.

Investor Relations Corporate Communication Media Relations Agency
Winston Yeo Isabelle Marand Suzanne Bakker
M.: +33 6 2947 0814 M.: +33 6 1489 1817 M. : +31 6 1136 8659
winston.yeo@gemalto.com isabelle.marand@gemalto.com suzanne.bakker@citigateff.nl
Sébastien Liagre
M.: +33 6 1751 4467
sebastien.liagre@gemalto.com

This press release contains inside information as referred to in article 7 paragraph 1 of Regulation (EU) 596/2014 (Market Abuse Regulation).

About Gemalto

Gemalto (Euronext NL0000400653 GTO) is the global leader in digital security, with 2016 annual revenues of €3.1 billion and customers in over 180 countries. We bring trust to an increasingly connected world.

From secure software to biometrics and encryption, our technologies and services enable businesses and governments to authenticate identities and protect data so they stay safe and enable services in personal devices, connected objects, the cloud and in between.

Gemalto’s solutions are at the heart of modern life, from payment to enterprise security and the internet of things. We authenticate people, transactions and objects, encrypt data and create value for software – enabling our clients to deliver secure digital services for billions of individuals and things.

Our 15,000+ employees operate out of 112 offices, 43 personalization and data centers, and 30 research and software development centers located in 48 countries.

For more information visit
www.gemalto.com, or follow @gemalto on Twitter.

This communication does not constitute an offer to purchase or exchange or the solicitation of an offer to sell or exchange any securities of Gemalto.

This communication contains certain statements that are neither reported financial results nor other historical information and other statements concerning Gemalto. These statements include financial projections and estimates and their underlying assumptions, statements regarding plans, objectives and expectations with respect to future operations, events, products and services and future performance. Forward-looking statements are generally identified by the words “expects”, “anticipates”, “believes”, “intends”, “estimates” and similar expressions. These and other information and statements contained in this communication constitute forward-looking statements for purposes of applicable securities laws. Although management of the Company believes that the expectations reflected in the forward-looking statements are reasonable, investors and security holders are cautioned that forward-looking information and statements are subject to various risks and uncertainties, many of which are difficult to predict and generally beyond the control of the Company, that could cause actual results and developments to differ materially from those expressed in, or implied or projected by the forward-looking information and statements, and the Company cannot guarantee future results, levels of activity, performance or achievements. Factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those estimated by the forward-looking statements contained in this communication include, but are not limited to: trends in wireless communication and mobile commerce markets; the Company’s ability to develop new technology and the effects of competing technologies developed; effects of the intense competition in the Company’s main markets; challenges to or loss of intellectual property rights; ability to establish and maintain strategic relationships in its major businesses; ability to develop and take advantage of new software, platforms and services; profitability of the expansion strategy; effects of acquisitions and investments; ability of the Company’s to integrate acquired businesses, activities and companies according to expectations; ability of the Company to achieve the expected synergies from acquisitions; and changes in global, political, economic, business, competitive, market and regulatory forces. Moreover, neither the Company nor any other person assumes responsibility for the accuracy and completeness of such forward-looking statements. The forward-looking statements contained in this communication speak only as of the date of this communication and the Company or its representatives are under no duty, and do not undertake, to update any of the forward-looking statements after this date to conform such statements to actual results, to reflect the occurrence of anticipated results or otherwise except as required by applicable law or regulations.

Attachments: http://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/2f9d9a10-431f-4191-8984-1125bfd427eb

‫شركة Gemalto توفر لحاملي بطاقات متاجر El Corte Inglés طريقة سهلة للتسجيل في محفظة Samsung Pay

شركة Gemalto توفر لحاملي بطاقات متاجر El Corte Inglés طريقة سهلة للتسجيل في محفظة Samsung Pay

  • المتجر الإسباني متعدد الأقسام يوفر السرعة والراحة المصاحبة لعمليات السداد عبر الهاتف الجوال لحاملي بطاقاته البالغ عددهم نحو 11 مليون شخص
  • حل Trusted Service Hub من شركة Gemalto يضمن التسجيل الآمن والسريع والسهل في خدمة Samsung Pay
  • تطبيق المدفوعات PURE يوفر لشركة Financiera El Corte Inglés* منظومة دفع مستقلة

أمستردام، 21 يوليو 2017 – تقوم شركة Gemalto، الرائدة على مستوى العالم في مجال الأمن الرقمي (والمسجلة في بورصة يورونيكست تحت الرمز NL0000400653 GTO)، بتمكين أكبر متجر إسباني متعدد الأقسام El Corte Inglés من أن يقدم لعملائه فرصة استكمال بطاقة مدفوعات المتجر الحالية بسهولة ويسر مع محفظة Samsung Pay الشهيرة للهواتف الجوالة. تجدر الإشارة إلى أن حل Trusted Service Hub (TSH) يضمن الانتقال السريع والآمن لخدمة الدفع عبر الهاتف لحاملي بطاقات El Corte Inglés. وهذه الخطوة الرائدة تجعل Financiera El Corte Inglés أول موفر بطاقات من القطاع الخاص في إسبانيا يتبنى خدمات  Samsung Pay.  ويعزز الحل القائم على تطبيق مدفوعات البطاقات البيضاء PURE الذي يتيح تكنولوجيا  EMV على بطاقات التسمية الخاصة، من الاستقلالية الكاملة لشركة التجزئة الإسبانية من خلال منظومة المدفوعات التي يقدمها.

إمكانية إنشاء البطاقات الرقمية Companion في التو واللحظة

 يمتلك بطاقة مدفوعات El Corte Inglés في الوقت الراهن ما يربو على 11 مليون مستهلك. وبالنسبة لهؤلاء المتسوقين فإن إنشاء بطاقة رقمية على محفظة Samsung Pay لن يتطلب أكثر من مجرد التسجيل على الإنترنت عن طريق منصة TSH لشركة Gemalto. تجدر الإشارة إلى أن منصة TSH لشركة Gemalto  توفر مجمل عملية التحويل الرقمي والترميز. وبعبارات أكثر بساطة، يستطيع حاملو بطاقات El Corte Inglés استبدال بيانات بطاقاتهم الفعلية بقيمة رقمية بديلة تُعرف باسم الرمز. ولا يتم تخزين سوى بيانات الرمز على الهاتف، مما يضمن حماية بيانات البطاقة الفعلية من المحتالين وإساءة الاستخدام.  وبالنسبة للعملاء، فإنهم يستفيدون من الراحة التي توفرها النسخة الرقمية من البطاقة لسداد مقابل السلع والخدمات، ويمكنهم مصادقة المعاملات بشكل لحظي وآمن من خلال نظام تحديد الهوية بالسمات البيولوجية.

 * Financera El Corte Inglésهي ذراع الخدمات المالية لمجموعة El Corte Inglés Group

نبذة عن Gemalto

Gemalto (المدرجة في بورصة يورونيكست تحت الرمز NL0000400653 GTO) هي الشركة الرائدة عالمياً في مجال الأمن الرقمي، بعائدات سنوية بلغت 3.1 مليار يورو في عام 2016 وعملاء في أكثر من 180 بلداً. نحن نحقق الثقة في عالم متزايد الترابط.

بدءً من البرمجيات الآمنة إلى البيانات البيومترية والتشفير، تمكّن تقنياتنا وخدماتنا الشركات والحكومات من التحقق من الهويات وحماية البيانات كي تبقى آمنة كما أنها تمكّن الخدمات في الأجهزة الشخصية، والكيانات المرتبطة والسحابة الحاسوبية وما بينها.

تقع حلول Gemalto في القلب من الحياة العصرية، من عمليات الدفع إلى أمن المؤسسات وإنترنت الأشياء. فنحن نتحقق من هوية الأشخاص، والمعاملات والكيانات، والبيانات المشفرة ونخلق قيمة للبرمجيات – بحيث نمكّن عملاءنا من تقديم خدمات رقمية آمنة لمليارات الأفراد والأشياء.

لدينا أكثر من 15,000 موظف يعملون انطلاقاً من 112 مكتباً، و43 مركزاً للتخصيص والبيانات، و30 مركز أبحاث وبرمجيات في 48 دولة.

للمزيد من المعلومات، قم بزيارة www.gemalto.com، أو تابعنا على تويتر عبر @gemalto.

مسؤولو الاتصالات الإعلامية في Gemalto:

شينتارو سوزوكي
آسيا باسيفيك
8266 6317 65+
shintaro.suzuki@gemalto.com

كريستيل تيراس
الشرق الأوسط وأفريقيا
89 57 01 55 1 33+
kristel.teyras@gemalto.com
فيليب بينيتيز
أمريكا الشمالية

لا يُعتبر نص هذا الإصدار الصحفي المُترجم صيغة رسمية بأي حال من الأحوال. النسخة الموثوقة الوحيدة هي الصادرة بلغتها الأصلية وهي الإنجليزية، وهي التي يُحتكم إليها في حال وجود اختلاف مع الترجمة

Dispatch: Criminalizing “Sympathy” – Free Expression Abuses Find New Catalyst in the GCC Crisis

Any end to the weeks-long Qatar-Gulf crisis was last month made contingent, in part, on the shuttering of Al Jazeera and its affiliate stations, as well as the closure of all news outlets that are—directly or indirectly, partially or wholly—funded by Qatar.

Justified by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Egypt as a legitimate means to stifle Qatar’s alleged “meddling” in their domestic affairs, these media-centric demands have been assailed by press freedom and human rights activists as “political censorship” and “an assault of free speech.”

The dichotomy raised by these opposing interpretations, as well as the outcomes they portend—internal security juxtaposed with deepened autocracy—is informative. The countries of the Saudi-led bloc have consistently situated these political realities as two sides of the same coin, framing the latter as an imperative means through which to maintain the former.

Amid the labyrinthine complexity of the Qatar-Gulf tensions, one development is clear: the Arab Gulf states have—in the years since the so-called Arab Spring—consolidated an already Orwellian hold on media and effectively criminalized free expression. The initial demand to shutter Al Jazeera and all Qatar-funded media is only the most recent and audacious indication that these states are intent to leverage the current diplomatic crisis to further advance ongoing censorship campaigns. In doing so, any objection to the positions adopted by those in power is maligned as a threat to national “interests, national unity and stability.”

“Objection” as a Punishable Criminal Offence

This is the line of strategy drawn around the ‘Qatar question’ by the Attorney General of the UAE, Hamad Saif al-Shamsi, who announced on 7 June that “Strict and firm action will be taken against anyone who…objects to the position of the United Arab Emirates.” In fact, those who so much as “show sympathy or any form of bias towards Qatar”—be it through “social media, or any type of written, visual or verbal form”—will face up to 15 years in prison and a minimum fine of AED 500,000 ($136,000) under the Federal Penal Code and the Federal law decree on Combating Information Technology Crimes.

Eager to conform to UAE policy, Bahrain waited less than 24 hours before its Ministry of Information Affairs issued a statement ordering national media to “comply with the Kingdom of Bahrain’s declared position” on the severance of diplomatic relations with Qatar, and “avoid the publication or circulation of anything that affects Bahrain’s highest interest.”

Shortly thereafter, the Bahraini Interior Ministry outlined the legal implications of failing to do so, stating in language nearly identical to that employed by Emirati Attorney General Shamsi that “Any expression of sympathy with the government of Qatar or opposition to the measures taken by the government of Bahrain, whether through social media, Twitter or any other form of communication, is a criminal offence punishable by up to five years in prison and a fine.”

It is clear from these parallel statements that Emirati and Bahraini authorities perceive the right to freely express opinions as not only inherently incompatible with, but inimical to their “interests.”

Relentless Judicial Harassment: Bahrain

The UAE and Bahrain’s “criminalization of sympathy” for Qatar marks the latest addition to an already expansive web of regulations designed to censor dissent in the Gulf. In the years since the peaceful pro-democracy uprisings of 2011, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states have increasingly supplemented violent repression with the ostensibly legitimate promulgation of counterterrorism and cybercrime legislation. Through an aggressive expansion of criminal law – or, in some cases, by grossly exploiting those provisions which already existed—governments across the Gulf have gradually closed nearly all space for activism and open political debate.

The case of leading Bahraini human rights defender Nabeel Rajab clearly illustrates such systematic manipulation of the law. Having posted tweets critical of the Saudi-led campaign in Yemen and condemning the use of torture in Bahrain’s Jau Prison, Rajab was charged with “deliberately announc[ing] in wartime false or malicious news, statements or rumors,” “insulting a neighboring country,” and releasing “abroad false or malicious news or statements or rumors about domestic conditions.”

In a second legal case, initiated by the Ministry of Interior’s Cyber Crime Directorate, Rajab was charged with “publishing and broadcasting false news that undermines the prestige of the state,” a reference to interviews he gave to various media outlets regarding the lack of access granted to international journalists seeking to report on issues inside Bahrain. On 10 July 2017, after a year in unlawful pre-trial detention, Rajab was convicted of these charges and sentenced to two years in prison.

Additional charges were brought against Rajab in September 2016, this time for a New York Timeseditorial, though these have not yet been formally prosecuted. If he is convicted of the remaining charges against him, Rajab could face more than 15 additional years in prison.

Given the integralrole that social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter play in facilitating civil society mobilization in Bahrain and the wider Arab Gulf, it is unsurprising that these states have placed such a strong focus on the prosecution of alleged cybercrimes. Among those first targeted was Jassim Al-Nuaimi, a Bahraini blogger and activist arrested in July 2013 and charged with “inciting hatred against the regime” and “calling for illegal protests through social media.” Al-Nuaimi is currently serving a five-year sentence.

Nabeel Rajab and Jassim Al-Nuaimi are hardly the only human rights defenders and peaceful government critics to be targeted solely for exercising the right to free expression in Bahrain. Activists, political figures, and religious leaders such as Abdulhadi al-Khawaja, Abdul Jalil al-Singace, and Sheikh Ali Salman are among some 4,000 political prisoners currently detained in the kingdom’s overcrowded prisons—a direct consequence of its relentless judicial harassment of independent civil society and peaceful opposition.

Legislating Silence: UAE

Authorities in the UAE have embraced similarly draconian legislation. It is not insignificant that Emirati Attorney General Shamsi invoked the Federal law decree on Combating Information Technology Crimes in his prohibition of sympathy for Qatar. Otherwise known as the cybercrimes decree, this edict was issued by President Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan in November 2012 and criminalizes the use of “information technology” to “publish or disseminate any information, news, caricatures, or other images liable to endanger state security and its higher interests.” An Emirati court sentenced social media activist Khalifa al-Rabia to five years in prison under this offense in March 2014, citing Twitter posts in which he criticized authorities’ ill treatment of political detainees and their families.

The Emirati cybercrimes decree explicitly criminalizes several public speech acts, such as using information technology “with the intent of deriding or harming the reputation, stature, or status of the state, any of its institutions, its president or vice president, the rulers of the emirates, their crown princes or their deputies, the state flag, national safety, its motto, its national anthem, or its symbols.” This particular charge has enabled the imprisonment of countless government critics, including Mohammed al-Zumer, Obaid Yousef al-Zaabi, and Osama al-Najjar, each jailed between 2012 and 2014 for condemning the torture of prisoners held by Emirati authorities on the basis of their peaceful political activity.

It was this provision that also afforded the legal cover under which university lecturer and pro-reform activist Dr. Nasser bin Ghaith was first detained in April 2011. Though pardoned by the president one day after an Emirati court sentenced him to two years in prison, Dr. bin Ghaith was forcibly disappeared by authorities in August 2015. Held incommunicado for eight months, Dr. bin Ghaith reappeared in April 2016 before the Federal Supreme Court’s State Security Chamber, where he was formally charged with five offenses enumerated in the UAE’s penal code provisions, cybercrimes decree, and 2014 counterterrorism law. Each of the charges represented a violation of free expression and association rights. On 29 March 2017, Dr. bin Ghaith was sentenced to 10 years in prison after being found guilty of, among other offenses, posting information “intended to damage the UAE” and publishing material online with “sarcastic intent” or to “damage the reputation” of the state or its leaders. The verdict, handed down by the Abu Dhabi Court of Appeals, is final.

The ruling came just nine days after the arrest and enforced disappearance of prominent Emirati human rights defender Ahmed Mansoor. First detained and tried in 2011 with Dr. bin Ghaith and three other activists who comprised the “UAE 5,” Mansoor has since been subjected to unremittinggovernment-sponsoredcybersecurityattacksandsurveillance. In the pre-dawn hours of 20 March 2017, Mansoor was arrested on the orders of the Public Prosecution for Cybercrimes. According to the state-run news agency, WAM, he is accused of using social media websites to “publish false information and rumors” and to “publish false and misleading information that harm national unity and social harmony and damage the country’s reputation.”

The “crimes” of which Mansoor is accused refer to his peaceful exercise of free expression rights. In the weeks leading up to his arrest, for example, Mansoor urged the UAE government to release Osama al-Najjar and Dr. bin Ghaith, highlighting the arbitrary and unlawful nature of their imprisonment. Accompanied by other human rights defenders from across the Arab world, Mansoor also signed a letter calling on leaders at the 29 March Arab Summit to release political prisoners being held in their respective countries. Perhaps the most damaging of infractions, however—for his potential prison sentence but also for the UAE government—was Mansoor’s use of Twitter to draw attention to human rights abuses being perpetrated in his country and throughout the region, and particularly those committed by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. It is for these actions that Ahmed Mansoor has been held in pre-trial detention by Emirati authorities for more than four months, and for which he, if convicted, will spend many more years in prison.

Geopolitical Aims and the Targeting of Critical Expression

It is ironic that while GCC states systematically invoke legal provisions to target free expression under the guise of advancing rule of law, stability, and national unity, they are, in fact, gravely violating international human rights laws and norms, and are in turn undermining these same objectives. With the exception of Oman, each of the GCC countries has ratified the Arab Charter on Human Rights. Though a flawed document, Article 32.1 of the Charter still provides that these states must respect, protect, and fulfill the “right to information and to freedom of opinion and expression, as well as the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any medium, regardless of geographical boundaries.”

Though Saudi Arabia and its partners recently attempted to walk back the Al Jazeera demand, the rhetoric employed in this concession is nonetheless telling. On 18 July, Saudi ambassador to the United Nations Abdallah Al-Mouallimi told UN correspondents that “the important thing is the objective” of ending incitement to violence and hate speech. “If we can achieve that without closing down Al Jazeera,” he said, “that’s…fine.” Betraying the intense international pressure that the Saudi-led bloc experienced on this demand in particular, Al-Mouallimi’s statement also seems to conflate independent journalism and incendiary provocation—a distortion often used as a pretext for censorship.

As the Saudi-led bloc prolongs its dispute with Qatar, it is becoming increasingly apparent that these tensions are being exploited to extend across the region what Bahraini political opposition leader Ebrahim Sharif once called the “trial of thoughts and ideas.” The diplomatic impasse now gripping the Gulf appears to be functioning as yet another forum in which Saudi Arabia and its partners can work to erode what little space remains for independent media and free expression, both within their respective borders and throughout the Gulf more widely.

Kylee DiGregorio is an Advocacy Intern at ADHRB.

Photo: AFP

Bahrain: US State Department Documents Decline in Terrorism Last Year, Continued Rights Concerns

On 19 July 2017, the United States (US) Department of State’s Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism (CT) released its Country Reports on Terrorism for 2016. Although the country report on Bahrain fails to assess the full impact of the kingdom’s increasing abuse of counterterror measures to target nonviolent activism and dissent, Americans for Democracy & Human Rights in Bahrain (ADHRB) welcomes the State Department’s continued engagement on combating terrorism in Bahrain and urges the Bahraini government to address the human rights concerns raised in the report.

The State Department finds that “terrorist attacks against [Bahrain’s] security forces declined in 2016,” with “at least three attacks result[ing] in casualties or injuries; only one of which involved explosives.” According to the report, Bahrain’s primary terror threats remain “violent Shia militants and ISIS sympathizers.” While Bahraini authorities continue to implement the kingdom’s expanded counterterror legislation and have reportedly begun drafting a “National Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) strategy in line with the UN Secretary-General’s Preventing Violent Extremism Plan of Action,” they did not institute any significant new counterterror measures in 2016. The State Department additionally finds that while the kingdom is experiencing continued ISIS activity, “Bahrain has not contributed substantively to the [Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS] military efforts since 2014.” Though the Bahrain country report does not provide evidence of Iranian involvement in the kingdom, the report on Iran states that “on January 6, 2016, Bahraini security officials dismantled a terrorist cell, linked to [the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps – Quds Force] planning to carry out a series of bombings.” The veracity of these links has been questioned in independent media reports on the incident.

Ultimately, the report presents a mixed review of Bahrain’s counterterror efforts in 2016. It asserts that “the Bahraini government continued to make gains in detecting, neutralizing, and containing terrorist threats,” but also notes concerns that these anti-terror measures have led to human rights violations, including arbitrary deprivation of nationality and the misuse of the INTERPOL red notice system to “pursue politically motivated cases against mainstream opposition and Shia activists without a history of involvement in violent acts.” Furthermore, the State Department highlights that the kingdom’s broad anti-terror legislation allows for the criminalization of speech acts and nonviolent dissent: “in Bahrain, the potential politicization of terrorist finance and money laundering issues threatens to conflate legitimate prosecutions of militants with politically-motivated actions against mainstream, nonviolent opposition and Shia community, including Shia clerics.” This appears to be a reference to the government’s June 2016 decision to issue an un-appealable denaturalization order against Sheikh Isa Qassim, Bahrain’s most prominent Shia religious leader, and to prosecute him for money laundering charges stemming from the traditional Shia practice of khums. Similarly, the report finds that the stalled national dialogue process has undermined effective counterterror operations: “The lack of trust between the government and opposition after several years of political paralysis may continue to complicate any government efforts to prosecute legitimate financial crimes, including the financing of terrorism.”

However, despite providing a more thorough analysis of relevant human rights concerns than the 2015 country report, the 2016 edition does not address the full breadth of the Bahraini government’s abuse of counterterror measures. It fails to acknowledge or explicitly condemn the scale of denaturalization, for example, with more than 450 individuals stripped of their citizenship since 2012, many of whom were ultimately rendered stateless and deported. The State Department also fails to note that amendments to Bahrain’s anti-terror and citizenship legislation allow the Ministry of the Interior to issue un-appealable denaturalization orders without trial, as in the case of Sheikh Isa Qassim, which violate international due process standards. United Nations (UN) human rights experts have repeatedlycondemned Bahrain’s use of counterterror mechanisms to conduct arbitrary denaturalizations and the State Department itself released a statement expressing “alarm” over the government’s “practice of withdrawing the nationality of its citizens arbitrarily” in 2016.

Furthermore, the report does not express concern over the anti-terror law’s explicit criminalization of free expression rather than the mere risk of conflation, in addition to the excessive authority the legislation grants to Bahrain’s security forces. The 2006 Law of Protecting Society from Terrorist Acts allows authorities to prosecute individuals as terrorists for speech that can be construed as “threatening the Kingdom’s safety and security or damaging national unity or security of the international community,” for example. In 2013 and 2014, amendments to the law expanded the government’s power to suspend due process in terror cases, such as extending the pre-charge and pre-trial detention periods for terror suspects. Bahraini authorities have increasingly used these provisions to arbitrarily detain nonviolent civil society actors, including most recently Ebtisam al-Saegh, a prominent woman human rights defender who has been continually arrested and tortured by security personnel in reprisal for her work.

These problems have been further aggravated in 2017, with the government amending Bahrain’s constitution to allow military courts to try civilians in terrorism cases. It also directly contravened previous reform commitments by re-empowering the National Security Agency (NSA), the kingdom’s intelligence service, with domestic detention authority after the institution was deeply implicated in torture and extrajudicial killing.

Additionally, the State Department’s CT Bureau overstates the government’s attempts “to build outreach through initiatives such as the community police” to reduce tensions and “bridge the divide” between the Shia majority community and the “mostly Sunni (and non-Bahraini origin)…police force.” In its separate 2016 report on Bahrain’s implementation of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) recommendations, the State Department stated that, according to the Bahraini government, a total of 1,500 community police had graduated from the Royal Police Academy by 2015. Though it went on to note that its “contacts have confirmed that Bahraini Shia have been among those integrated into the community police and the police cadets,” it found that this integration had not occurred “in significant numbers.” Moreover, the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) determined that these new units play only a “marginal” policing role, and local activists report that community police personnel are unarmed and typically operate under the strict supervision of standard security forces. Community police are known to man checkpoints while armed Ministry of Interior officers observe from nearby vehicles, for example. Aside from the limited number of Shia community police, there is no evidence to suggest that Bahraini authorities have taken further steps toward incorporating Shia into the security forces, as the US Government has consistently advised. The Bahrain country report likewise omits growing evidence that sectarian discrimination in Bahrain’s police and armed forces, including the propagation of extremist discourse, has led to increased extremism among security personnel.

Similarly, while it notes that the Bahraini government has used unsubstantiated terror accusations to dissolve the country’s major opposition political groups, like the Al-Wefaq National Islamic Society, the State Department does not assess how attacks on independent political and civil society have motivated militancy, despite reporting that “a sense of economic and political disenfranchisement…remained a primary driver of violent extremism in 2016.”

 “It’s positive that the State Department remains committed to countering violent extremism in Bahrain and is aware of some of the severe human rights abuses being committed in the name of fighting terrorism,” said Husain Abdulla, ADHRB’s Executive Director. “But the CT Bureau should better coordinate with its counterpart in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor to present a holistic picture of human rights and security in Bahrain. The US cannot effectively work with the Bahraini government to defuse extremism when the authorities label human rights defenders terrorists and use anti-terror laws to crush dissent. Any strategy that fails to take these factors into account threatens to inflame, rather than reduce, militancy and instability.”

In light of the Bahraini Minister of Interior’s recent visit to Washington to discuss further cooperation with American security officials, it is especially imperative that the US Government acknowledge the full scale of human rights violations associated with Bahrain’s counterterror efforts. ADHRB therefore reiterates its support for the State Department’s engagement on countering violent extremism in the kingdom, but urges it to further investigate and document abuses committed by the Government of Bahrain under the guise or in service of counterterrorism. Further, we call on the State Department and other US agencies like the Departments of Homeland Security and Defense to recognize the challenges posed by such abuses to achieving American anti-terror objectives in Bahrain, and to condition any continued collaboration on substantive security sector reform. To that end, we also call on the Government of Bahrain to take all necessary action to safeguard human rights while combating violent extremism, specifically by repealing or significantly amending the anti-terror law to decriminalize fundamental freedoms, bringing an end to arbitrary deprivation of nationality, and eliminating arbitrary detention, torture, and religious discrimination.

Gemalto offers El Corte Inglés store card holders an easy route to Samsung Pay

  • Spain’s biggest department store  brings the speed and convenience of mobile payment to its about 11 million cardholders
  • Gemalto’s Trusted Service Hub ensures secure, quick and easy registration to Samsung Pay
  • PURE payment application offers Financiera El Corte Inglés* an independent payment eco-system

Amsterdam, 21 July 2017 – Gemalto (Euronext NL0000400653 GTO), the world leader in digital security, is enabling El Corte Inglés, Spain’s biggest department store, to offer customers the opportunity to easily  complement their existing store payment card with the popular Samsung Pay mobile wallet. Gemalto’s Trusted Service Hub (TSH) ensures a swift and secure transition to the mobile payment service for El Corte Inglés card holders. The pioneering move makes Financiera El Corte Inglés the first private label card provider in Spain to adopt Samsung Pay.   The payment solution is based on PURE, a white label payment application which brings EMV technology to private label cards, reinforcing the Spanish retailer complete autonomy with its payment eco-system.

Companion digitized cards can be created in an instant

Over 11 million consumers currently hold an El Corte Inglés payment card. For these shoppers, creating a digital card on Samsung Pay will involve nothing more than a simple online enrolment powered by the Gemalto TSH platform. Gemalto’s TSH provides the entire digitalization and tokenization process. In simple terms, El Corte Inglés card holders can opt to replace the physical card’s credential with a substitute digital value known as a token. Only the token’s data is stored on the phone, ensuring that the real card credentials are protected from fraudsters and misuse. As for customers, they benefit from the convenience brought by the digital card to pay for goods and services and can authenticate transactions instantly and securely using biometrics.

*Financera El Corte Inglés is the Financial Services arm of El Corte Inglés Group

About Gemalto

Gemalto (Euronext NL0000400653 GTO) is the global leader in digital security, with 2016 annual revenues of €3.1 billion and customers in over 180 countries. We bring trust to an increasingly connected world.

From secure software to biometrics and encryption, our technologies and services enable businesses and governments to authenticate identities and protect data so they stay safe and enable services in personal devices, connected objects, the cloud and in between.

Gemalto’s solutions are at the heart of modern life, from payment to enterprise security and the internet of things. We authenticate people, transactions and objects, encrypt data and create value for software – enabling our clients to deliver secure digital services for billions of individuals and things.

Our 15,000+ employees operate out of 112 offices, 43 personalization and data centers, and 30 research and software development centers located in 48 countries.

For more information visit www.gemalto.com, or follow @gemalto on Twitter.

Gemalto media contacts:

Philippe Benitez
Americas
+1 512 257 3869
philippe.benitez@gemalto.com
Kristel Teyras
Europe Middle East & Africa
+33 1 55 01 57 89
kristel.teyras@gemalto.com
Shintaro Suzuki
Asia Pacific
+65 6317 8266
shintaro.suzuki@gemalto.com

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